Introduction
While the economics literature has paid considerable attention to collusion in Bertrand and Cournot markets, collusion with di¤erent sorts of competition has been largely neglected. In this note we take a …rst step towards the analysis of collusion in pure location games as introduced by Hotelling (1929) . Such models capture competition in many important industries where price competition is not feasible, for example, because of regulation (as in the case of pharmacies) or vertical restraints (as in the case of book sellers). 1 Our results are based on an approach that relies on rather weak rationality requirements.
In particular, we do not solve the non-cooperative game in which some of the players can reach binding agreements. Instead, we simply require that players will only decide to collude if they can guarantee themselves a payo¤ better than the payo¤ expected "behind the veil of ignorance". The reason for this approach is simple: it is as we will see extremely di¢cult to …nd Nash equilibria for location games with collusion. We argue that in the absence of reliable non-cooperative solutions players should be conservative and only collude if they know for sure that this will be pro…table. Accordingly, our de…nition of pro…tability relies on a maxmin approach. Nevertheless, we include one section on Nash equilibrium where we show that in some cases the non-cooperative solution coincides with ours.
For linear and circular cities with a uniform distribution of consumers we …nd that collusion is pro…table if and only if more than half of the players collude. Part of this result can be generalized to location games in multi-dimensional spaces with arbitrary density functions: As long as the distribution of consumers is atomless, collusion can only be pro…table if more than half of all …rms cooperate. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we are also able to derive su¢cient conditions for collusion to be pro…table. These results are of considerable relevance for the topic of merger in markets with limited price competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general setup and notation. Section 3 deals with the simplest one-dimensional cases, i.e., with linear and circular cities with uniform consumer densities. Section 4 deals with the general multi-dimensional case and establishes the main theorem of the paper. Section 5 adds su¢cient conditions for collusion to be pro…table in games on the unit line, unit circle and unit square. Section 6 discusses Nash equilibria for location games with collusion and Section 7 concludes. 1 They can also be applied to parliamentary elections that are not winner-take-all contests. 2 
Setup and de…nitions
Let ¡(O; P ) be a location game on O µ R k with set of players P . Let p i 2 P be player i with If there are more than one closest player then the consumer is assumed to buy from each closest player with the same probability. The price of the good is …xed at 1 and production costs are normalized to zero.
Player p i 's market share and pro…t is then given
where r i denotes the number of players located at x i . By assumption,
By virtue of this fact, we say that a player's expected payo¤ before the game is actually played ("behind the veil of ignorance") is Suppose m > n¡ m, i.e., suppose that more than half of all …rms are in the set of colluding players.
In that case the colluding players can minimize the payo¤ obtainable to a …rm outside the coalition by "evenly spreading out." If f is uniform, the …rms in the set can guarantee themselves a payo¤ of 3m¡n 2m by locating themselves at (k; 3k; 5k; :::; 1 ¡ k) with k = . Furthermore, the worst thing that can happen to the players in M is that the …rms outside locate in di¤erent intervals, say, one between k and 3k, one between 3k and 5k and so on. If they do, the players in M earn 1 ¡ 
( 1 )
, collusion is not pro…table if exactly half of all …rms cooperate. The proof is completed by showing that collusion is also not pro…table
Circular cities
A further popular space to study location games on is a circle. In contrast to the line a set of m colluding …rms can divide a circle into at most m arcs as opposed to m + 1 segments on the line.
Nevertheless, one obtains the identical condition for collusion to be pro…table. Proof Position the colluding …rms such that there are m arcs with mass 1 m each. If m¸n 2 the max i mum t ot al payo¤ t he n on -co l l u di ng …r ms ca n ob t ai n i s n¡m 2m , i.e., by using this strategy the colluding …rms can ensure a payo¤ of 
The multi-dimensional case
The following result is the main result of the paper. It generalizes one of the two insights gained above, namely that collusion in location games can only be pro…table if more than half of all …rms cooperate. This result holds for arbitrary bounded open subsets of R k and for arbitrary bounded atomless density functions. Proof Suppose the m colluding players p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p m locate at x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x m 2 O, not necessarily distinct.
Case 1. n ¡ m¸2m. Then for each i, 1 · i · m, let p m+2i¡1 and p m+2i locate at x m+2i¡1 and x m+2i , two points " units apart on a line through x i , with x i between x m+2i¡1 and x m+2i and " chosen as follows: Let B be a k-dimensional ball containing O and let A be the k ¡ 1-dimensional volume of the k ¡ 1-dimensional disk formed by intersecting B with a hyperplane through its center. Choose " such that " < 1 nA sup f and such that " is small enough to guarantee x 2m+i¡1 ; x 2m+i 2 O for 1 · i · m. Let the rest of the non-colluding players, p 3m+1 ; p 3m+2 ; :::; p n locate anywhere in O. Since the consumers won by
prov contains the points in O that are nearer to x i than to any other x j 6 = x i with both i; j · m. Accordingly, de…ne the provisional payo¤
prov ; ¼ 2 prov ; :::; ¼ m prov is non-decreasing. Now locate 3m ¡ n of the non-colluding players at x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x 3m¡n and use the remaining 2n ¡ 4m players to bracket x 3m¡n+1 ; x 3m¡n+2 ; :::; x m as in case 1, but do net yet choose ". Notice that (i) 3m ¡ n > 0;
Since the sequence ¼ 1 prov ; ¼ 2 prov ; :::; ¼ m prov is non-decreasing, the sum of the provisional payo¤s
m . Therefore, the …nal total payo¤s to the colluding players Remark 2 The theorem concerns location games de…ned using Euclidean distances, i.e., straight line distances. Implicitly, this means that consumers may travel along routes that do not belong to O. However, the theorem applies, for example, to a circle (or rather the conclusion of the theorem holds-see Remark 1) even when the distance between two points is the length of the arc joining them, since for a circle in R 2 a consumer's nearest player is the same whether distance is de…ned as Euclidean distance or as arc length.
The theorem disallows atoms of consumers. The following example demonstrates the necessity of this assumption.
Example Consider the 5-player location game on The main theorem above showed that m > n 2 is necessary for collusion to be successful. In the following we will establish su¢cient conditions for collusion to be pro…table in a location game played on the unit interval, the unit circle, and the unit square. Notice that in each case the solution prescribes that the colluding players behave according to the above identi…ed strategies, i.e., they will evenly spread out making other players indi¤erent between locations.
Proposition 3 In linear cities, collusion pays if
Remark 3 Note that sup f= inf f¸1. Thus, the condition in Proposition 3 ensures that m > n=2.
6
Proof of Proposition 3 W.l.o.g. let x 1 · x 2 · ::: · x m be the set of locations occupied by the colluding players chosen so that
If a non-colluding player locates to the left of x 1 or to the right of x m , his payo¤ is at most
If a non-colluding player locates between x i and x i+1 , his payo¤ is
If a non-colluding player locates at x i , 1 · i · m, then he shares the market set O i with p i .
By the argument above, the portion of O i to the left of x i has consumer mass less than 1 n , as does the portion of O i to the right of x i . Therefore, the payo¤ to each non-colluding player is less then (
n . Since in all these cases the payo¤ to a non-colluding player is less than 1 n ; the total payo¤ to the colluding players is more than 1 ¡ Proof Analogous to the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3.¤ 4 Moreover, the …rms located at x 1 and x m could move further into the interior as the mass on the fringes has only to be smaller than Proof Suppose m; n and h satisfy the hypotheses of the theorem. Consider the set C of points in
2h+1´w here i and j are integers, 1 · i; j · 2h + 1, and i and j are not both even. There are exactly (2h + 1) 2 ¡ h 2 points in C. Locate the m colluding players so that there is at least one of them at each point of C (recall that m¸(2h+1) 2 ¡h 2 ).
In the course of proving that an in…nite square lattice is a Nash equilibrium for the location game in the plane with consumers distributed uniformly, Knoblauch (2002) 4 . This interpretation follows from the fact that for large n there is an integer h such that n < (2h + 1) 2 , 
Nash equilibria
It is natural to ask about the relationship between pro…tability as discussed above and Nash equilibrium. Consider, for instance, a location game on the unit interval [0; 1] with consumers distributed uniformly, played by several independent …rms and one player who controls a set of …rms. Can we …nd location strategies for the independent …rms so that these strategies together with the pro…table collusion strategy identi…ed above comprise a Nash equilibrium?
It is possible to answer this question in some special cases and we shall do this below.
However, in general the problem is very di¢cult, perhaps intractable.
The di¢culty arises from two sources. The …rst thing one discovers when working on the problem is that a Nash equilibrium requires mixed strategies for the independent …rms. Unfortunately, due to the computational complexities, little is known about mixed strategy equilibria for 8 location games on the unit interval. Shaked (1982) constructed a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for three …rms locating on [0; 1], and there are nonconstructive existence theorems by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Simon (1987) . Second, the di¢culty in …nding mixed strategy equilibria is compounded when one player controls m locations, due to the added computational complexity.
Prospects are even bleaker for location games with collusion in dimensions 2 and higher.
Up to now, nothing has been published on location games in dimension 3 or above, and little on solutions for location games in dimension 2. Shaked (1975) showed that there are no pure-strategy Nash equilibria for a wide variety of 3-player location games in the plane; Okabe and Aoyagi (1993) proved that an in…nite square array of …rms in the plane is a Nash equilibrium for a uniform distribution of consumers, and Knoblauch (1997) catalogued all 3-player equilibria on the 2-sphere when consumers are distributed uniformly.
In summary, the di¢culty of …nding mixed strategy equilibria for location games translates into di¢culty for our problem-…nding equilibria for location games with collusion. It seems reasonable that …rms that engage in games that game theorists are unable to solve should choose rather conservatively when it comes to making big decisions such as decisions about colluding or merging with others. We have therefore proposed pro…tability as a conservative criterion to be used by …rms faced with collusion decisions or merger proposals.
Nevertheless, the following proposition answers the question posed at the beginning of this section in the a¢rmative in the special case that the number of locations controlled by the "big" player is an integral multiple of the number of independent …rms. Proposition 6 Let G be a location game in which consumers are distributed uniformly on [0; 1] with density 1, players 1; 2; : : : ; n ¡ m; are independent …rms, player n ¡ m + 1 controls m locations and m = a(n ¡ m) where a is a positive integer greater than 1. Let s n¡m+1 be player n ¡ m + 1's strategy from Section 3.1, which picks locations at each element of the set fk; 3k; 5k; : : : ; 1¡kg, where k = 1=2m. For i = 1; 2; : : : ; n ¡ m, let s i be player i's strategy that assigns probability 1 a to each of the a points (2ai¡2a+1)=2m, (2ai¡2a+3)=2m; : : : ; (2ai¡1)=2m. 5 Then (s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s n¡m ; s n¡m+1 ) 5 To illustrate, consider the case in which there is only one independent player (i.e., m = a = n-1). In this case the independent player chooses each of the m equidistant locations chosen by the …rm controlling the coalition with probabilty 1/m. Alternatively, consider the special case of n = 6 and m = 4 (a=2), i.e. there are two independent players and one player controlling a 4-…rm coalition. In this case the coalition …rms will occupy locations 1/8, 3/8, 5/8, and 7/8 whereas the …rst (second) independent player chooses locations 1/8 and 3/8 (5/8 and 7/8) with probability 1/2 each.
is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof Fix i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n ¡ mg. Let H be a game like G but with only two players, so that 1 is an independent …rm and 2 controls m locations. It remains to show that player n ¡ m + 1 can't improve his payo¤ by a unilateral strategy change.
Let t n¡m+1 be any pure strategy of player n ¡ m + 1. Let K be a game like G but with two players each of whom controls m locations. Then by the de…nitions of s i ,
: : : ; s i¡1 ; (2ai ¡ 2a + 2j ¡ 1)=2m; s i+1 ; : : : ; s n¡m ; t n¡m+1 )
The inequality follows from the fact that any consumer (or fraction of a consumer) awarded to the …rst player in game K will contribute to one of the summands on the left side of the inequality. For example, suppose t n¡m+1 assigns three locations to k, two locations to 5k + 1 2 and no location to any point between. How does the consumer interval (2k; 3k) contribute to the two sides of the inequality? Player 1 in game K wins all of (2k; 3k). Player 1 in game G wins all of (2k; 3k) in the summand ¼ G i (3k; s 2 ; : : : ; s n¡m ; t n¡m+1 ) and one quarter of (2k; 3k) in the summand ¼ G i (k; s 2 ; : : : ; s n¡m ; t n¡m+1 ). Therefore ¼ G n¡m+1 (s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s n¡m ; t n¡m+1 ) · 1 ¡ (n ¡ m)=2m = (3m ¡ n)=2m · ¼ G n¡m+1 (s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s n¡m ; s n¡m+1 ) with the last inequality following again from the pro…tabil-ity argument of Section 3.1. ¤
Discussion
We …nd that collusion in location games only pays if the set of colluders is larger than the set of non-colluding competitors. Bilateral collusion, for example, can only pay if there are no more than three competitors. This result is based on an approach which relies on rather weak rationality requirements. It assumes that players discussing some binding agreements to collude will only go ahead if they can guarantee themselves a payo¤ better than the payo¤ expected "behind the veil of ignorance". This maxmin approach prescribes that colluding players should spread themselves out, making players outside the colluding set indi¤erent between locations. This seems to be rather intuitive: One would expect that two colluding supermarkets (or supermarkets belonging to the same chain) locate in di¤erent parts of one city to avoid cannibalization. For a special case of competition on the unit interval, we show that the maxmin strategy is also used in a non-cooperative equilibrium.
Our results may have implications for the topic of mergers in markets with (pure) spatial competition as an example of which competition among big book retailers (where price competition is extremely limited) may serve. As merger in the traditional sense (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 1983) where …rms simply "disappear" never pays in such location games, merger can only be pro…table if the merging units are kept as separate units which are governed by central headquarters. This is identical to the case of collusion analysed above. However, the analysis reveals that with this kind of competition only "mega mergers" are likely to occur. 6 
